More is Lost in Cuba

More is Lost in Cuba
ANTONIO JOSÉ PONTE | Madrid | 22 Oct 2015 - 2:08 pm.

Spain suffers from 'Maine Syndrome'. What do we do now that Cuba and the
United States are re-establishing diplomatic relations?

There is a recurring Spanish nightmare in which an American battleship
blows up, there come orders for a full withdrawal, and the country
retreats in an agitated panic, conscious of the disaster... of what was
lost in Cuba. In November the Spanish Army's Chief of Staff, General
Jaime Domínguez Buj, spoke of that nightmare, when he attributed the
situation in Catalonia to the capital's weakness, and recalled the loss
of Cuba and the Philippines.

It's now back. You can find it on the editorial pages of various
newspapers and in articles asking what role Spain will play after
relations between Cuba and the United States are restored. What will be
the nature of Spain's relationship to Cuba? This is the "Maine
Syndrome." Nobody expressed it more clearly than Socialist MEP Ramón
Jáuregui when he referred to investments on the island: "Everything is
waiting to be done, and either the Americans will do it, or we will."

Wondering about Spain's role amidst the agreements reached by Obama and
Castro arrangements might sound like narcissism, based on the delusion
that it all, or much, will depend on Spain's gestures. This criticism,
in turn, has to do with a struggle between parties: the Socialists
conclude that, if only the (conservative) Popular Party had adopted
different policies, Spain's participation in Cuba would be much greater.
Apparently they are unaware that, when negotiating with dictatorships,
there is no guarantee that a given cause will produce a given effect.

The overtures of a Moratinos could do little to change things in Habana
(remember Raúl Castro's elation in 2010 at the victory of Spain's
national football team). Neither could García-Margallo have achieved
much had he been received at the Palacio de la Revolución. And the only
beneficiaries of another meeting between Zapatero, Moratinos and Castro
would have been Zapatero and Moratinos. Right now the Common Position
might not exist, the PP could break its promises even more with regards
to the Cuban issue, and the PSOE could be in power. But it wouldn´t
matter. Spain would continue to be ignored by Cuba, slighted because its
economy is viewed as unable to provide the kind of investments and loans
expected to come from the United States.

Under these circumstances, how can the Maine Syndrome be fought, beyond
expressions of bravado like that from Jauregui? When President Obama
announced his new policy towards Cuba, he mentioned those who might be
the true drivers of change: small businesses on the island. In the new
scenario, supporting and strengthening these stakeholders means
supporting the country's democratization. This is, without any doubt,
one of the areas where Washington will run into the greatest obstacles,
for Raúl Castro does not support strengthening anything but his
famiglia. Raúl Castro is an expert at stymying change, to such an extent
that Cubans have even come up with a variation on the Spanish verb
ralentizar (to slow down): raulentizar.

The question of how to reach out to those entrepreneurs is bound to be
among the most complex questions to be addressed by Washington. It may
also be among the most neglected, along with the defense of human
rights. And it is here where Spain boasts a big advantage: its over
100,000 nationalized Spaniards residing in Cuba.

Thanks to the terms of the Historical Memory Law enacted under President
Zapatero, Spain has this unique asset on the island. Among those more
than 100,000 Spanish/Cuban citizens, there will be entrepreneurs who
need assistance and investments. And if, as recommended by the historian
and political scientist Tomás Pérez Viejo, an ambitious project was
undertaken, and Spain avoided the repeated "mistake of basing diplomacy
on companies," Spain could instead center its diplomatic efforts around
the fate of this group of citizens, with all the benefits for the
democratization that this would entail.

The country, of course, would have to maintain its official contact with
Cuba. But there is no doubt that Spanish authorities will need to do
more than merely protect those investments existing in Cuba today,
which, far from serving to democratize the country, are held by agents
in cahoots with the regime, as they violate workers' most basic rights.



This article appeared in El País. It is published here with the author's
permission.

Source: More is Lost in Cuba | Diario de Cuba -
http://www.diariodecuba.com/cuba/1445515682_17646.html