Miriam Celaya, Translator: Norma Whiting
At last, skeptics have been able to confirm the accuracy of their
assessment of the insolubility of the Cuban problem from government
"initiatives". The Sixth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, held
last April, didn't go beyond a situational formality intended to
legitimize the decisions previously issued by the top leadership of the
country and give the green light to the same outmoded system, generator
of the national crisis, despite the supposedly reformist varnish that
was intended to give some attractive luster to the always drab event.
After the Sixth Congress, it became clear that the improvisation as the
system's own method has reached its limits. It was an event that did not
materialize steps, phases, timelines and specific proposals, and whose
"agreements" apply stale cryptic language in which ambiguity remains the
official recourse to prevent obligations and elude responsibility.
In many areas and in virtual opinion forums the problem of the
impossibility of partial changes in the midst of a systemic crisis is
being discussed; a thesis that is being confirmed, for example, by the
apparent contradiction of simultaneously implementing economic measures
while increasing repressive actions against sectors not in tune with the
system. All the ongoing "opening up/repression" — in which the latter is
much more visible — is based on the authorities' knowledge of an
elementary principle: any movement within a totalitarian system, however
minimal, will, sooner or later, lead to the total transformation of that
system. In Cuba, after half a century of ideological wear and sustained
"massification" of individuals, limited autonomy or opening up of any
kind could lead to the precipitation of events that would ruin the
regime's "renovation project" and, consequently, the regime itself. The
hastiest response to avoid this, on the part of the system, is to nip
any expression of disagreement or dissent.
Apart from official decisions, however, is the Island's asphyxiating
sociopolitical and economic situation. The first part of this year has
seen an accentuation of a markedly unsalvageable dichotomy: on the one
hand, General Raúl Castro needs to implement, in a relatively short
time, his economic measures destined to the "upgrading of the model". On
the other hand, the social equilibrium gets more fragile at every turn,
a product of the general crisis of the system, which goes against both
the effective completion of said process of reforms as well as against
the government's forecasted results. Behold, the General faces an almost
impossible mission: to demonstrate the viability of the process of
economic reforms that tend to grant independence to large sectors of the
population –let's not forget that the government itself seeks to ensure
that the planned layoffs will be conducive to increasing the sector of
self-sustaining protobusinessmen that will contribute to the economy
through taxation — while maintaining social control in order to retain
all power. The whole dilemma revolves around whether it would be
possible for the regime to stay in the role of shepherd of a flock of
more than one million individuals who will stop being "masses" to turn
into citizens as the result of the application of those same government
measures, or if an eventual process of reforms would stimulate the
strengthening of an independent civil society stemming from the
emergence of groups with common interests, that is, a theoretical
situation of checkmate, judging by the position of the pieces that can
be seen on the board.
This situation, in turn, has led to a slowdown in reform implementation,
demonstrating that the reversal of the general paralysis is much more
difficult and complex than expected by the renovation ideologues from
their comfortable climate-controlled cabinets. A recent Council of
Ministers, chaired by the General, had, among the items on its agenda,
the analysis on the implementation of self-employment applied so far,
"which proved inadequate in its initial basic preparation" which is seen
as a congenital inability of some municipal leaders to create "the
conditions necessary to ensure adequate care for those interested in
this employment alternative". This, coupled with the usual bureaucratic
ills (request for documents not required by law, undue delay of
proceedings, etc.), in turn settles the top leadership's inability to
make himself understood by his subordinates — or in his failure — their
reluctance to abide by guidelines from above ("authority crisis?). Half
a century of top leadership has failed to prepare for its adequate
replacement, not even to save it from its own interests, but aiming at
being the vanguard that would protect the interests of the entire
nation. Nothing could better illustrate the insurmountable fissures of
the system.
At the same meeting, the ministers approved the proposal "to extend the
timetable for executing the process of availability of the labor force"
or, in words without any euphemisms, to also slow the layoff plans, a
measure that corresponds with the insufficient answer to private
business as a viable alternative to unemployment in the Cuban realm.
That is, even if not articulated in that fashion, several factors
demonstrate how reality problems go far beyond the scope of the official
proposals: the lack of sufficient stimulus on the part of the
potentially interested in this "employment alternative", faced with
difficulties, such as high tax rates, the lack of wholesale markets for
materials, supplies, etc., plus the risks of investing one's own
limited resources in a country where approximately 20% of the active
labor population will be unemployed, among other factors.
While the government has slowed the implementation of reforms and
layoffs, an apparent radicalization of dissent is taking shape. This is
a process that is experiencing a modest but steady growth, which could,
simultaneously, be affecting the depletion of the system, the general
crisis of values, the standardization of poverty and corruption at all
levels, the loss of credibility in the Revolution, government and
institutions, the lack of expectations and a host of other countless,
equally significant factors, including the very repression.
Paradoxically, the regime has simultaneously maintained a marked
tendency to the systematic harassment of individuals and groups critical
of the system, thus enabling the expansion of the range of sectors
potentially hostile to the government and, additionally, granting
visibility and importance.to them.
Using suicidal logic, authorities have stepped up harassment,
intimidation, threats, beatings, "operatives" and brief arrests, with
the intention to stifle any possible outbreak of riots and to discourage
the emergence of new alternative spaces, succeeding in the opposite
effect: strengthening the role of dissidents, awakening the sympathy of
the population for those persecuted — who are usually, at least,
respected by the supposed courage of confronting the regime's power —
exposing, each time, the perverse nature of the system, positioning the
magnifying lens over the growing civic and opposition activism, and
helping to extend a feeling of latent rebellion among those who
desperately seek other options in the face of the failure of the
communist experiment. Similarly, it has become extremely difficult for
authorities, seeking the support of economic powers and political
forums, to provide a friendly face to foreign powers as it establishes,
as a mechanism of control inside the country, a kind of "terror
attenuated" which is the selective application of the repression over
isolated individuals and groups to maintain a climate of mute panic over
the rest of the population..
Today, Cuba is becoming aware that, if the government leads in the
economic plan, imposing its rhythm and depth on the reforms basic to the
state's monopoly in this sphere, in the social aspect, alternative or
independent civic groups are marking the beat through pressure that the
authorities can't afford to ignore indefinitely. An unequivocal sign of
progress in this regard is that several groups have already passed the
initial stage of catharsis in critical areas, and are taking frankly
responsible positions in the process of making citizens out of the
masses of slaves. The social offensive is tilting the balance in favor
of sectors with new proposals, truly innovative ideas, and a rather
conciliatory and inclusive discourse. Somehow, it has begun to cause the
breakdown of the social immobility before the end of the economic
stagnation, probably because, as the economy remains subject to the
power center, civic niches, as a social phenomenon, have relative
independence in that respect. A general, more defining spirit of radical
changes, with greater depth and a more comprehensive one than Raúl's
reforms is thus intensifying, gradually.
Among the main attractions of the alternative sectors are open public
debates, free press, free flow of ideas and opinions, the right of
association, and access to information and communications; requirements
that correspond to real time, as the rest of the world we live in, whose
denial can no longer hide behind barricading slogans and enemies of the
occasion. In an incipient, but visible manner, a web has begun to be
woven — still fragile but tenacious — from the meeting of dissimilar
minds that are being joined by a spirit of shared civility. It is too
soon for triumphalist predictions: In Cuba, better forged ideas have
failed more than once, but this one is perhaps the last hopeful spark,
barely a log floating in the ocean of the national shipwreck. Over a
century of revolutionary experiments leaves no room for doubt.
Evolution, not revolution. We have no other choice.
(Published in the magazine Voices 8 for the month of May)
Translated by Norma Whiting
June 3 2011
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