LATIN AMERICA
Chávez, cancer and Cuba: the implications for U.S. policy
BY JAIME SUCHLICKI
jsuchlicki@miami.edu
A nervous, frail and thin Hugo Chávez returned to Venezuela recently
after cancer surgery in Cuba. The dangerous illness and sudden surgery
of the Venezuelan leader has raised speculation and concern in his
country as well as in Cuba.
If Chávez's continuous control of Venezuela begins to crumble, who would
succeed him? Will the military intervene in the political process? Will
Venezuelans unite around an opposition leader to defeat an ailing Chávez
or an appointed successor?
Although it may be too early to tell with any certainty, Chávez may be
unable to run in the next presidential elections in 2012. This could
lead to a rift in the Chavista ranks, providing an opportunity for an
opposition victory. This requires a united opposition around one
candidate, not a likely event. A succession to Chávez's brother is
possible but may increase dissatisfaction among Chavistas. Increased
instability within the government or among dissatisfied Venezuelans may
lead to violence and a military intervention, a scenario favored by Cuba
given its significant dependence on Venezuela.
Impact on Cuba
For the Castro brothers, the continuity of the Chavista regime, with
Chávez, his brother or a friendly successor, is critical for Cuba's
stability. Venezuela continues to provide the island with 100,000
barrels of petroleum a day on subsidized terms, significant other
investments and remains as Cuba's main ally in Latin America.
If Venezuela were to fall into the hands of the opposition or enter a
chaotic period, Chavista largess may come to an end. Cuba's few
industries, the transportation and electric systems will suffer as they
did after the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. With less electricity and harsher times, Cubans may become more
restless and be willing to risk more riots and demonstrations in a
darkened country.
Yet the crisis may not be as deep as the one in the 1990s. Gen. Raúl
Castro has visited and worked out petroleum arrangements with Angola,
Russia, Brazil and Iran. The latter in particular, as well as others,
may want to come to Cuba's rescue, albeit temporarily and on different
terms than the Venezuelans. The island today is also not as dependent on
Venezuela as it was on the Soviet Union in the pre-1990 period. Cuba has
diversified its trading partners and has forged political and economic
alliances with a variety of countries, especially Iran, China, Russia,
Brazil and others.
Finally, Cuba's exports are not as tied as they were in the Soviet era
to sugar when the sweetener was the island's major export. Cuba today
sells nickel, rum, cigars and pharmaceuticals, has a well-developed
tourist industry and enjoys large-scale remittances from Cuban exiles.
This is not to say that the Cubans will not suffer. Yet predicting an
economic collapse would be a great stretch.
Raúl Castro may be hoping for time. Offshore oil exploration in Cuba's
northern coast, if successful, may yield enough petroleum in the next
three to five years to replace the Venezuelan bonanza. Cuba's security
and military personnel in Caracas may go to great lengths to guarantee a
continuation of the Chavista regime. A more open Cuban intervention,
however, may further antagonize the Venezuelans and prove counterproductive.
The U.S. factor
Since the initial years of the Cuban revolution, no regime in Latin
America has challenged the national-security interests of the United
States like Venezuela. Chávez's close relationship with Iran, his
support for Iranian nuclear ambitions and his involvement in the affairs
of neighboring countries all pose a major challenge to the United States.
For the past eight years, U.S. policy has either ignored or mildly
chastised Chávez for his policies and activities. That policy is no
longer viable or prudent. The United States needs to develop policies
that undermine the Chávez regime, organize and unify the opposition and
accelerate the end of his rule. Covert operations to strengthen
opposition groups and civil societies are urgently needed. Vigilance and
denunciation of Venezuelan-Iranian activities and Chávez's meddling in
Colombia and elsewhere are critical to gain international support for
U.S. policies.
While regime change in Venezuela may be a difficult policy objective,
Chávez's illness, growing discontent, economic difficulties and possible
rifts in the Chavista regime may offer significant opportunities. The
long-term consolidation of Chavista power in Venezuela may present a
greater threat than the one posed in the 1960s by the Castro regime.
Unlike Cuba, Venezuela has significant oil wealth and is a large country
that borders on several South American neighbors. Chávez's alliances
with Iran, Syria and other anti-American countries, and his support for
terrorist groups, while representing an asymmetrical threat, are as
formidable a challenge as the Cuban-Soviet alliance.
A comprehensive, alert policy is required to deal with the threat posed
by Chávez's actions, Iranian inroads in the hemisphere and Venezuela's
evolving situation. Chávez is, after all, Fidel Castro's disciple and
heir in the region. The lessons of the Missile Crisis of 1962 should
increase our uneasiness about Chávez's adventurism and Iranian
motivations in Venezuela and Latin America.
Jaime Suchlicki is director of the Institute for Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He is author of
'Cuba: From Columbus to Castro.'
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